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A COSTLY VICTORY: JUNE MEDICAL, 
FEDERAL ABORTION LEGISLATION, AND 
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT  
Thomas J. Molony* 
I. INTRODUCTION
 The United States Supreme Court’s recent major abortion 
ruling in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo1 was a win for 
abortion rights supporters, but a costly one.  Although the June 
Medical Court struck down a Louisiana law requiring abortion 
doctors to have admitting privileges at a local hospital,2 a majority 
of the Justices—and most importantly, Chief Justice Roberts, 
whose concurrence constitutes the Court’s holding—stressed that 
Casey’s constitutional standard for pre-viability abortion 
regulations is not the amorphous balancing test the Court 
suggested in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, but a more 
deferential one under which a pre-viability regulation typically 
will be sustained if it does not place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability.3 
Pro-choice advocates seem to have realized immediately 
what June Medical portends because, amidst their cheering the 
* Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.
1. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
2. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020) (“We . . .
hold that the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional.”). 
3. See id. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Nothing about Casey suggested that a
weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts. . . . Casey 
instead focuses on the existence of a substantial obstacle . . . .”); id. at 2154 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“Casey . . . rules out the balancing test adopted in [Hellerstedt].”); id. at 2165 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“The District Court should apply Casey’s ‘substantial obstacle’ test, 
not the [Hellerstedt] balancing test.”); id. at 2179 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legal 
standard the plurality applies when it comes to admitting privileges for abortion clinics turns 
out to be exactly the sort of all-things-considered balancing of benefits and burdens this 
Court has long rejected.”); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[F]ive Members of the 
Court reject the [Hellerstedt] cost-benefit standard.  . . . I agree with [that] conclusion[].”).  
34 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:1 
result, they renewed calls for federal legislation4 to protect the 
constitutional right to choose that the Court recognized in 1973.5  
Two days after inauguration, the Biden administration declared 
that it is of the same mind, so a bill to “codify[] Roe v. Wade” may 
not be far away.6   
Proposing measures to protect a woman’s ability to have an 
abortion, however, is not something new.  Members of Congress 
have introduced and reintroduced bills of this type many times 
over the years.  In 2007, for example, the day after the Court 
upheld the federal partial birth abortion ban in Gonzales v. 
Carhart,7 then Senator Barbara Boxer introduced the Freedom of 
Choice Act (FOCA),8 legislation that supposedly would enshrine 
Roe v. Wade in federal law.  Barack Obama promised to sign 
FOCA as his first act as President.9  That didn’t happen, and 
beginning in 2014, members of the House and Senate began 
proposing the more modest Women’s Health Protection Act 
(WHPA), a version of which Representative Judy Chu and 
4. See Colin Seeberger, The Supreme Court Rejects Attempt to Undermine Abortion
Rights in June Medical Services v. Russo, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/GP7J-D3HG (“Reliance on the courts . . . is not enough; state and federal 
legislation is also necessary to prevent attacks on abortion care and proactively improve 
access.”); Supreme Court Rules in favor of Abortion Providers in June Medical Services v. 
Russo, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/KW45-VZWD (“It’s time 
for Congress to pass . . . a federal bill that would ensure the promise of Roe v. Wade is 
realized in every state for every person.”); NARAL President Ilyse Hogue Comments on 
Supreme Court Decision in June Medical Services v. Russo, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. 
(June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/C8C9-K9AU (“This case underscores the need for federal 
protections for abortion rights.”); ACLU Statement on Supreme Court Ruling in June Medical 
Services v. Russo, ACLU (June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/NR9B-PGLN (“This is a critical 
victory for Louisianans, but . . . the right to get an abortion is far from secure. . . . That’s why 
Congress must . . . help ensure that a person who needs abortion care is able to get it . . . .”); 
Herminia Palacio, How Congress Can Immediately Seize on Monday’s Abortion Rights Win, 
REWIRE NEWS GRP. (June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/EAP7-DXC8 (“[W]e need federal 
action to restore and protect access to abortion across the whole country . . . .”). 
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (declaring that a woman has a
constitutional right to have an abortion). 
6. Statement from President Biden and Vice President Harris on the 48th anniversary
of Roe v. Wade, White House (Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/5M4G-FWZ7. 
7. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (concluding that the federal
partial-birth abortion ban is constitutional). 
8. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. (2007).  Senator Boxer first
introduced a similar bill in 2004.  See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 2020, 108th Cong. (2004). 
9. See Irin Carmon, Pro-choice politicians try playing offense (again), MSNBC (Nov.
13, 2013), https://perma.cc/7Q5J-E3A7 (“The first thing I’d do as president is sign the 
Freedom of Choice Act.”) (quoting then-presidential candidate Barack Obama). 
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Senator Richard Blumenthal most recently sponsored in 2019.10  
The irony of the abortion rights victory in June Medical, though, 
is that it weakens Congress’s power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws like FOCA and WHPA.   
Both FOCA and WHPA cite Section 5 as a source of 
congressional authority.11  Which makes sense as a general 
proposition, for when the Court decided to preserve Roe’s 
“essential holding” in its 1992 Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision,12 it declared that a 
woman’s right to have an abortion emanates from the guarantee 
of liberty secured under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.13  Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce 
the rights the Clause protects.14 
But Congress’s power under Section 5 is not unlimited.  As 
the Court explained in City of Boerne v. Flores when it decided 
that Congress did not have the power under Section 5 to impose 
on state and local governments the limitations under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act,15 Congress may use Section 5 to adopt 
remedial or deterrent legislation, but it may not use it to effect a 
substantive change to the Due Process Clause.16  And to be 
10. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong.; Women’s
Health Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 2795, 116th Cong.  Senator Blumenthal first introduced 
a similar bill in 2013.  See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2013, S. 1696, 113th Cong. 
11. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007) (proposing
congressional power for legislation); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 
116th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (proposing congressional power for legislation).  The two bills also 
suggest that the Commerce Clause supplies Congress with the necessary power.  See 
Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007); Women’s Health Protection 
Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(3); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing 
that “Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
12. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992). 
13. See id. (“The controlling word . . . is ‘liberty.’”).  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
15. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (concluding that Congress
could not require State and local governments to comply with the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993). 
16. See id. at 519 (“The design of the Amendment and the text of §5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”). 
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preventative rather than substantive, “many of the laws affected 
by the congressional enactment [must] have a significant 
likelihood of being unconstitutional.”17 
That’s why June Medical is so significant to Section 5 
power.  Because of June Medical, the probability that an abortion 
regulation contravenes a woman’s due process rights has declined 
sharply.  Congress’s Section 5 power is more constrained than 
previously thought.  
This Article explores Congress’s ability to use its power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact FOCA 
and WHPA.  Part I describes what FOCA and WHPA attempt to 
accomplish.  Part II briefly discusses the relationship between the 
Federal Government and the States before turning to the contours 
of Congress’s Section 5 power, with particular attention to City of 
Boerne and important decisions that followed it.  Next, Part III 
analyzes the extent to which Section 5 might sustain FOCA and 
WHPA.  In so doing, this Article explains how June Medical 
simultaneously opened the door to state regulation of abortion and 
weakened congressional power under Section 5 to protect 
abortion rights.  Part IV then considers the implications for 
Section 5 power if the Court goes beyond June Medical and 
overrules Roe.  Finally, this Article concludes that, if Congress 
wishes to adopt FOCA or WHPA, it will need to find its power 
somewhere other than Section 5. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ACT AND THE
WOMEN’S HEALTH PROTECTION ACT
As the Court in Casey reaffirmed Roe’s “essential 
holding,”18 it opened the door to increased State and Federal 
regulation of abortion.19  And when the Gonzales Court 
determined that the opening was wide enough to allow the federal 
17. Id. at 532.
18. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992). 
19. See, e.g., id. at 873 (“[A] necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and
the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our view, that we abandon the 
trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the 
protection of fetal life.”). 
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partial-birth abortion ban, FOCA’s sponsors saw a threat to Roe 
and concluded that they needed to act.20   
FOCA is sweeping legislation.  It attempts to bar 
government at every level—federal, state, and local—from 
“deny[ing] or interfer[ing] with” a woman’s right to choose to 
have an abortion either before fetal viability or when necessary to 
protect her life or health after viability.21  Moreover, FOCA would 
prohibit measures that discriminate against a woman’s “exercise 
of the[se] rights . . . in the regulation or provision of benefits, 
facilities, services, or information.”22  Importantly, FOCA would 
not permit a government to escape its restrictions under any 
circumstances—even when a regulation is supported by a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.23 
WHPA is more modest.  Although the proposed legislation 
applies to all levels of government24 and similarly would 
invalidate any ban on abortion prior to viability or a ban after 
viability that does not include an exception to allow the procedure 
when “continuation of the pregnancy would pose a risk to the 
pregnant patient’s life or health,”25 WHPA gives governments a 
bit more latitude with respect to regulations that might “interfere” 
with a woman’s ability to choose.  And rather than seeking a 
20. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(9) (2007) (“[T]hreatening Roe,
the Supreme Court recently upheld the first-ever Federal ban on [an] abortion [procedure] 
. . . .”). 
21. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(1) (2007).  Departing from
Roe’s definition, FOCA defines “viability” as “that stage of pregnancy when . . . there is a 
reasonable likelihood of the sustained survival of the fetus outside of the woman.”  Freedom 
of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 3(3) (2007); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 
(1973) (indicating that viability is the “point at which the fetus becomes . . . potentially able 
to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.”). 
22. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (2007).
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (indicating that, following Roe, “regulation[s] touching
upon the abortion decision . . . [could] be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further 
a compelling state interest.”). 
24. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(e)
(addressing the Act’s relationship to Federal law); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, 
S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 5 (addressing the Act’s relationship to State and local law).
25. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(9).  Like
FOCA, departing from Roe, WHPA defines “viability” as “the point in a pregnancy at which 
. . . there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained fetal survival outside the uterus with or 
without artificial support.”  Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. 
§ 3(5).
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return to Roe, WHPA takes aim at so-called TRAP—Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Providers—measures that purport to 
regulate abortion for the purpose of fostering maternal health, but 
that pro-choice advocates insist are intended to limit access.26 
WHPA would bar a host of specific TRAP laws, including 
those that require certain tests and procedures, that limit the 
ability to use certain drugs or telemedicine, that require hospital 
privileges, or that impose credentialing or facility standards.27  
WHPA also would prohibit some waiting periods, as well as laws 
that place limitations on abortion based on a woman’s reasons for 
having one.28  More broadly, though, WHPA would free abortion 
providers from laws similar to those specified and from other 
measures that “both—(A) single[] out the provision of abortion 
services, health care providers who provide abortion services, or 
facilities in which abortion services are provided; and (B) 
impede[] access to abortion services based on [specified 
factors].”29   
Unlike FOCA, however, WHPA does not impose an 
absolute bar on all regulations of the types specified.  Instead, 
WHPA allows a challenged regulation to stand if the government 
successfully “establish[es], by clear and convincing evidence, 
that—(1) the limitation or requirement significantly advances the 
safety of abortion services or the health of patients; and (2) the 
safety of abortion services or the health of patients cannot be 
advanced by a less restrictive alternative measure or action.”30 
26. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Jan. 2020), https://perma.cc/24LD-246L (defining TRAP laws as “regulations[] targeted 
specifically at abortion clinics that go beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety,” 
and contending that the “primary purpose [of these laws] is to limit access to abortion.”); see 
also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (describing the 
law’s purposes). 
27. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. §§ 4(a)(1), (4-
6). 
28. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. §§ 4(a)(7), (11)
(barring “medically unnecessary in-person visits” and regulations that require a woman to 
state her reasons for having an abortion or prohibit a physician from performing an abortion 
based on a woman’s reasons). 
29. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2).
30. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 4(d).
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III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A. Limitations on Congressional Power
Driving both FOCA and WHPA is the threat that state 
legislation poses to the availability of abortion access throughout 
the country.31  The Constitution, however, does not give Congress 
dominion over the States.32  Under the federal system the 
Constitution preserves, the States are separate, “indissoluble” 
sovereigns,33 and only when Congress acts within the confines of 
the powers delegated to it under the Constitution can Congress 
encroach on the States’ ability to govern what happens within 
their borders.34 
When Congress acts pursuant to its delegated powers, the 
federal legislation reigns supreme and overrides inconsistent state 
laws,35 but the Constitution “contains no whatever-it-takes-to-
solve-a-national-problem power.” 36  Thus, regardless of what 
Congress may perceive about the importance of nationwide 
access to abortion, its authority to adopt FOCA and WHPA must 
find its roots in a power specified in the Constitution.   
31. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (“An
independent review . . . found that . . . the biggest threats to the quality of abortion services 
in the United States are State regulations that create barriers to care.”); Freedom of Choice 
Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong § 2(10) (2007) (“Incremental restrictions on the right to choose . . . 
have made access to abortion care extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many women 
across the country.”).   
32. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018)
(“[C]onspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue 
direct orders to the governments of the States.”). 
33. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868).
34. See, e.g.,  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (“The Federal Government . . . must show that a constitutional grant of 
power authorizes each of its actions. . . . The Constitution may restrict state governments . . . 
.  But where such prohibitions do not apply, . . . [t]he States . . . can and do perform many of 
the vital functions of modern government.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“[I]f 
there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.  It is beyond 
peradventure that federal power over commerce is ‘superior to that of the States to provide 
for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those 
necessities may be.”). 
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
36. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 659-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
40 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:1 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution represents the original 
delegation of congressional power.37  Various amendments 
adopted over the years, however, have expanded Congress’s 
power such that it may adopt legislation to enforce the 
amendments’ substantive features.38  One such amendment is the 
Fourteenth,39 and with a woman’s right to choose ostensibly 
found in Section 1’s Due Process Clause,40 both FOCA and 
WHPA identify Congress’s enforcement power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as one of the sources of power for the 
legislation.41  Critical to understanding the scope of this power are 
the Court’s 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores and the 
rulings that followed it. 
B. City of Boerne and Its Progeny
In City of Boerne, the Court evaluated whether Section 5 
gave Congress the authority to impose on state and local 
governments the restrictions set forth in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).42  Enacted in 1993 on the heels of the 
Court’s landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
RFRA provides that a government may not “substantially burden 
a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government can 
establish that it has a compelling interest for doing so and uses the 
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing Congress’s powers).
38. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (granting Congress enforcement power);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (same); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (same). 
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“Congress [has] power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the [amendment’s] provisions.”). 
40. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy 
derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”). 
41. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(14) (2007) (proposing
congressional power for legislation); Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 
116th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (same). 
42. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (indicating that the case
required the Court to determine whether Congress had the power to enact the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
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“least restrictive means” of advancing its interest.43  To apply 
RFRA against the States, Congress looked to Section 5.44 
The positive grant of authority under Section 5, the City of 
Boerne Court explained, allows Congress to enact remedial and 
deterrent legislation even when the legislation encroaches on 
traditional state legislative power and bars conduct that the 
Constitution permits.45  But the Court stressed that Congress 
cannot use Section 5 to expand the meaning of Section 1’s Due 
Process Clause: “There must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.  Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect.”46  Moreover, 
according to the Court, although Congress has substantial 
freedom to determine what legislation is necessary to enforce 
Section 1,47 Section 5 does not permit Congress to usurp the role 
of the judiciary.48 
According to the Court, Congress went too far with RFRA.49  
In Smith, the Court held that neutral laws of general applicability 
do not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.50  Though laws directed at religion had to satisfy a 
demanding constitutional test,51 the City of Boerne Court pointed 
43. Id. at 515-16.
44. See id. at 516-17 (indicating that Congress relied on Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment as the source of authority for imposing RFRA’s requirements on state and local 
governments). 
45. See id. at 517-18 (describing the scope of congressional power under Section 5).
46. Id. at 520.
47. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to
‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”). 
48. See id. at 524 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against
the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing.  . . . The power 
to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”). 
49. See id. at 536 (“RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation
of powers and the federal balance.”). 
50. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise
of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object . . . but merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended.”); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (describing the Smith 
Court’s holding). 
51. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (stating that if “the law is not neutral, . . . it is invalid unless it is justified by a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”); see also City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (citing City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533). 
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out that RFRA’s legislative record did not reflect a recent history 
of religious bigotry or laws intentionally discriminating against 
religious exercise.52  More importantly, the Court remarked that 
RFRA’s breadth belied a remedial aim: 
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that . . . . [i]t appears . . . to attempt a 
substantive change in constitutional protections.  
Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may 
be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of 
the laws affected . . . have a significant likelihood of being 
unconstitutional.53   
The Court noted that RFRA was broad, reaching every level 
of government and all laws—Federal, State, and local.54  
Although the Court indicated that the absence of a termination 
date or geographic limits (like those found in remedial voting 
rights legislation) was not dispositive, RFRA failed to include 
such provisions, which would have tailored its scope.55  
Moreover, the Court emphasized that RFRA’s compelling 
interest/least restrictive means test placed disproportionate 
burdens on the States, significantly “intru[ding] into the States’ 
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the 
health and welfare of their citizens.”56 
Following City of Boerne, the Court principally has applied 
the decision’s lessons in cases in which states have claimed 
sovereign immunity from private lawsuits for violations of federal 
laws barring discriminatory conduct.  In those cases, the Court 
explained that Congress effectively abrogates sovereign 
immunity when its legislation clearly reflects a congressional 
intent to do so, and Congress has the power to regulate the 
relevant conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.57  
52. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (indicating that the legislative record was
devoid of “examples of legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the 
burdened religious practices or that . . . indicate some widespread pattern of religious 
discrimination in this country.”) 
53. Id. at 532.
54. See id. (describing RFRA’s breadth).
55. See id. at 533 (indicating the absence of limitations of the types present in remedial
voting rights legislation). 
56. Id. at 534.
57. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004) (explaining the conditions under
which Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity); Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
2021 A COSTLY VICTORY 43 
The Court uniformly determined that Congress sufficiently had 
indicated its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity in the statutes 
at issue,58 but applying City of Boerne, the Court reached differing 
conclusions as to Congress’s Section 5 power.59  
The first notable case after City of Boerne, though, did not 
involve an anti-discrimination measure.  In Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank, the Court considered whether Congress had the power 
under Section 5 to enact the Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), a law that 
subjected states to liability for patent infringement.60  The Court 
concluded that Congress did not have that power.61  
The Florida Prepaid Court recognized that, through the 
Patent Remedy Act, Congress sought to address the harm patent 
holders suffer when they are not compensated for state patent 
infringement,62 but similar to what the City of Boerne Court had 
noted in relation to RFRA, the Court in Florida Prepaid observed 
that the congressional record supporting the patent legislation did 
not identify a “pattern of patent infringement by the States, let 
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”63  Moreover, the 
U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (same); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 
(2001) (same); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (same); see also Allen 
v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000-01 (2020) (stating what is required to abrogate sovereign
immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
635 (1999) (same).  The Court consistently has recognized that Congress cannot abrogate
sovereign immunity through its Article I powers.  See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1001 (indicating
that Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity when it draws its power from Article I);
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727 (same); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364 (same); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80
(same); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636 (same).
58. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1001 (indicating that Congress effectively indicated its
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity); Lane, 541 U.S. at 518 (same); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 
726 (same); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64 (same); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (same); Fla. Prepaid, 
527 U.S. at 635 (same). 
59. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (finding that the statute could not be sustained under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 374 (same); Kimel, 528 
U.S. at 80-83 (same); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647 (same).  But see Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 
(finding that the statute was sustainable under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728, 735 (same). 
60. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631-32 (describing federal patent law).
61. See id. at 630 (indicating that Congress could not use is Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power to enact the patent law). 
62. See id. at 639-40 (specifying the “‘evil’ or ‘wrong’ that Congress intended to
remedy”). 
63. Id. at 640.
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Court explained, the Fourteenth Amendment only protects 
against the deprivation of property without due process, and 
Congress had not given much attention to whether state remedies 
were inadequate.64  Furthermore, the Court added that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects against intentional conduct and 
that most of the evidence suggested that state patent infringement 
was unintentional.65  The Court stressed that Congress had not 
attempted to tailor the Patent Remedy Act to non-negligent 
infringement for which a state-court remedy is unavailable or to 
limit the Act’s application to particular states with a pattern of 
infringement or without adequate remedies.66  According to the 
Court, “it simply cannot be said that ‘many of [the acts of 
infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a 
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.’”67   
A year after Florida Prepaid,68 the Court in Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents decided that Congress did not have the power 
under Section 5 to enact the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) with application to state and local governments.69  
In so doing, the Court emphasized that age is not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, and therefore, state legislation that 
discriminates based on age need only satisfy the deferential 
rational basis standard of review, under which a law passes 
constitutional muster so long as it bears a rational relationship to 
a legitimate government interest.70 
64. See id. at 643-44 (discussing state law remedies).
65. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (noting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment).
66. See id. at 646-47 (observing the absence of limitations).
67. Id. at 647.
68. Later in the same year, the Court addressed Section 5 in United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).  According to the Morrison Court, Section 5 could not sustain Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) because it was directed at private action rather than state 
action and imposed penalties on private officials rather than state officials.  See id. at 625 
(stating that VAWA “is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have 
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias”).  Because FOCA and WHPA are 
directed at state action, Morrison generally is inapposite to Congress’s Section 5 authority 
to adopt those bills.  Therefore, detailed attention to Morrison in this Article is not warranted.  
69. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (describing the Court’s
conclusion). 
70. See id. at 83-84 (describing the standard for assessing the constitutionality of
legislation that discriminates based on age). 
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For the Kimel Court, the relevant standard of review was 
critical to its determination that ADEA did not satisfy City of 
Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test: “[t]he Act . . . 
prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and 
practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the 
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”71  The Court 
stressed that ADEA makes age-based discrimination “prima facie 
unlawful” and that its “bona fide occupational qualification[s]” 
defense could not save the law because the defense required proof 
that the classification was a “reasonable necessity.”72  According 
to the Court, the standard for the defense was more like the 
“heightened scrutiny” that would apply to a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification.73 
The Kimel Court added, however, that the wide net that 
ADEA casts was not enough to preclude Section 5 power.74  The 
Court also had to consider the harm that Congress intended to 
remediate or prevent: “[d]ifficult and intractable problems often 
require powerful remedies . . . .”75  As in City of Boerne and 
Florida Prepaid, though, the Court in Kimel found lacking a 
record of unconstitutional state age discrimination.76  The Court 
discounted a California age discrimination study because it did 
not suggest that the State’s discriminatory conduct was 
unconstitutional,77 and the Court indicated that, even if the study 
had identified unconstitutional age discrimination, the study 
would not justify applying ADEA to every state.78  According to 
the Court, “Congress’[s] failure to uncover any significant pattern 
of unconstitutional discrimination . . . confirms that Congress had 
71. Id. at 86.
72. Id. at 86-87 (discussing the bona fide occupational qualifications defense).
73. See id. at 87-88 (indicating that the standard under the ADEA was far higher than
the constitutional standard). 
74. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (“That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to
be held unconstitutional . . . does not alone provide the answer to our §5 inquiry.”). 
75. Id. at 88-89 (noting that remedial efforts must be measured against the harm to be
addressed). 
76. Id. at 89 (indicating the deficiencies in the congressional findings).
77. Id. at 90 (“[T]he California study does not indicate that the State had engaged in
any unconstitutional age discrimination.”) (emphasis in original). 
78. Id. (discussing the geographic scope of ADEA).
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no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was 
necessary in this field.”79  
In 2001, the Court turned from ADEA to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), deciding in Board of Trustees of 
University of Alabama v. Garrett that Congress did not have the 
power under Section 5 to force state governments to comply with 
Title I’s employment discrimination provisions.80  As with age in 
Kimel, the Court in Garrett observed that disability is not a 
protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, 
measures that discriminate based on disability are subject only to 
a rational basis standard.81  And again, consistent with Kimel, the 
Court concluded that Congress had not identified a sufficient 
pattern of unconstitutional conduct,82 and even if it had, the scope 
of Title I’s prohibition against employment discrimination was so 
broad that it effected a substantive alteration of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning.83   
According to the Court, the legislative record included fewer 
than ten instances of state employment discrimination, and the 
discrimination in those cases was not necessarily irrational and 
therefore unconstitutional.84  The Court added that the standard 
that an employer must satisfy for relief from its obligation to 
make an employment accommodation—establishing “that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship”85—was much 
more rigorous than the Constitution’s rationality requirement.86   
79. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
80. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (concluding
that Congress did not have the power under Section 5 to extend the Title I antidiscrimination 
provisions to the States). 
81. See id. at 366-67 (specifying the standard of review applicable to disability-based
discrimination). 
82. Id. at 368 (“The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment 
against the disabled.”). 
83. See id. at 372 (“Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by the ADA 
against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality 
as were found in City of Boerne.”).  
84. Id. at 368-69 (discussing the absence of evidence of unconstitutional discrimination
in the legislative record). The Court considered evidence of local government or societal 
discrimination immaterial.  Id. (discussing the legislative record). 
85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added) (reciting the ADA’s exception).
86. Id. at 372 (“[E]ven with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what
is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that 
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With heightened scrutiny applicable to gender 
discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 
reached a different conclusion regarding Congress’s Section 5 
power to extend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) 
to the States.87  Referring to Garrett and Kimel, the Hibbs Court 
pointed out that, because discrimination based on age and 
disability is subject to the rational basis standard of review, 
evidence of widespread discriminatory conduct was necessary to 
confer Section 5 power.88  According to the Court in Hibbs, the 
higher standard of review for gender discrimination eased 
Congress’s burden of “show[ing] a pattern of state constitutional 
violations.”89   
The evidence in the congressional record, the Hibbs Court 
determined, was sufficient.90  The Court noted in particular that 
both public and private employers had failed to treat men and 
women comparably with respect to leave for childcare, and the 
Court emphasized that “differential leave policies were not 
attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women, 
but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for 
family members is women’s work.”91  Moreover, the Court 
credited evidence of disparate treatment of men by state 
employers, even when the policies for women and men were 
comparable.92  
Having identified ample congressional findings, the Hibbs 
Court then determined that FMLA represented a proportionate 
response.93  By extending family leave benefits to all employees, 
the Court pointed out, Congress had tried to reduce an employer’s 
would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon the 
employer.”). 
87. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (noting the FMLA’s
aim and the applicable Fourteenth Amendment standard of review); id. at 740 (concluding 
that application of the FMLA to the States is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 
authority). 
88. Id. at 735 (discussing Garrett and Kimel).
89. Id. at 736.
90. Id. at 734.
91. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731
92. See id at 732 (discussing discriminatory application of facially comparable
policies). 
93. Id. at 740.
48 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:1 
temptation to hire men rather than women and attempted to drive 
out stereotypes about the roles men and women play in caring for 
their families.94  In addition, the Court distinguished City of 
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, stating that “FMLA is narrowly 
targeted at the faultline between work and family—precisely 
where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains 
strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment 
relationship.”95  Moreover, the Court highlighted structural 
aspects of FMLA that further limit its scope.  For example, the 
Court noted that the statute allows for unpaid leave, only applies 
to employees with a certain tenure, and requires advance notice 
when a leave is anticipated.96 
Though the Garrett Court had decided that Congress did not 
have the power under Section 5 to apply Title I of the ADA to the 
States, 97 consistent with Hibbs, the Court in Tennessee v. Lane 
concluded that—to the extent that Title II seeks to assure “basic 
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to 
more searching judicial review”—Congress could use its Section 
5 power to make the States subject to Title II’s prohibition against 
discrimination in benefits from services, programs, and 
activities.98  Among these basic guarantees, the Court explained, 
are “access to the courts,” which serves the rights to procedural 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, to free speech 
under the First Amendment, and to certain protections in criminal 
proceedings under the Sixth Amendment.99 
The Court in Lane stated that “Congress enacted Title II 
against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the 
administration of state services and programs, including 
systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”100  As proof, the 
Court cited state laws discriminating against the disabled in 
voting, marriage, and jury service and previous rulings in which 
the Court determined that state agencies unconstitutionally 
94. Id. at 737 (discussing the FMLA’s aims).
95. Id. at 738.
96. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739 (listing limitations to the FMLA’s scope).
97. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
98. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004).
99. Id. at 523 (describing constitutional rights the protection of which requires access
to courts). 
100. Id. at 524.
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discriminated against the disabled with respect to zoning, 
institutional commitment, and the provision of mental health 
care.101  The Court added that lower courts similarly had 
concluded that the disabled had been subject to unlawful 
discrimination in connection with “public services, programs, and 
activities.”102  Looking even more narrowly, the Lane Court 
credited evidence before Congress suggesting that disabled 
individuals were being prevented from accessing the courts and 
participating in a meaningful way in court proceedings.103  
Evaluating Title II’s proportionality to the harms identified, 
the Court acknowledged that Title II applies to a wide range of 
activities and services but limited its evaluation to court access 
and did not opine as to other activities, such as access to public 
hockey rinks.104  And with respect to court access, the Lane Court 
decided that Title II was sufficiently limited, requiring only 
“reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers 
to accessibility.”105  Thus, according to the Court, “Title II, as it 
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of 
access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’[s] 
§5 authority.”106
The Court’s foray again into Section 5 power, in Allen v. 
Cooper, was a 2020 reprise of Florida Prepaid, but in the 
copyright context.  And the result was the same.107  The Cooper 
Court concluded that Congress could not use Section 5 to enact 
the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), a 
statute that sought to make states liable for copyright 
infringement.108 
101. See id. at 524-25 (citing evidence of unconstitutional discrimination).
102. Id. at 525.
103. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 (describing the evidence Congress considered when it
enacted the ADA). 
104. See id. at 530-31 (specifying the scope of the Court’s decision).
105. Id. at 531.
106. Id. at 533-34.
107. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 998-99 (2020) (“[T]his Court held in Florida
Prepaid . . . that the patent statute lacked a valid constitutional basis.  Today, we take up the 
copyright statute.  We find that our decision in Florida Prepaid compels the same 
conclusion.”). 
108. See id. at 999 (explaining what CRCA does).
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“Florida Prepaid all but prewrote [its] decision,” the Cooper 
Court declared.109  Referring to Florida Prepaid, the Court in 
Cooper explained that the Due Process Clause only precludes the 
intentional or perhaps reckless taking of a copyright when no 
adequate state remedy is available.110  Observing that a report 
before Congress identified “only a dozen possible examples of 
state [copyright] infringement”111 and noting that just two of the 
twelve examples involved conduct that might violate the Due 
Process Clause, the Cooper Court did not see evidence of 
constitutional harm sufficient to differentiate CRCA from the 
Patent Remedy Act for Section 5 purposes.112  Thus, consistent 
with Florida Prepaid, the Court in Cooper concluded that CRCA 
failed City of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” 
requirement: “[T]he scope of the two statutes is identical—
extending to every infringement case against a State. . . .  In this 
case, as in Florida Prepaid, the law’s ‘indiscriminate scope’ is 
‘out of proportion’ to any due process problem. . . . and 
[therefore] . . . is invalid under Section 5.”113 
IV. JUNE MEDICAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
FOCA AND WHPA 
As the Court’s decisions from City of Boerne to Cooper 
testify, evidence of unconstitutional activity and the related 
constitutional test are critical to determining the scope of 
Congress’s Section 5 power.  Thus, evaluating FOCA and WHPA 
in relation to Section 5 requires one to understand the 
constitutional standard that governs to abortion regulations.  That 
standard is the undue burden test the Casey Court adopted, and 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical controls 
what the test requires. 
109. Id. at 1007.
110. See id. at 1004-05 (discussing the Due Process Clause’s requirements).
111. Id. at 1006.
112. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (evaluating the congressional record).
113. Id. at 1007.
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A. June Medical L.L.C. v. Russo
To grasp the contours of Casey’s undue burden test and what 
June Medical means for the test, one best starts with the familiar 
trimester framework that the Court established in Roe and 
replaced in Casey.  Roe’s trimester framework specified a series 
of tests that would apply over the course of a woman’s 
pregnancy.114  During the first trimester, according to the Roe 
Court, a woman had the right, based on her physician’s medical 
judgment, to terminate her pregnancy “free of interference by the 
State.”115  After the end of the first trimester, Roe explained, the 
right became subject to a State’s ability to regulate abortion in 
service of the State’s interest in maternal health.116  And finally, 
the Court decided, once a fetus becomes viable—the point at 
which the fetus can live outside the womb with or without 
medical assistance117—a State may bar a woman from choosing 
abortion except when “it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of [her] life or health.”118 
As the Casey Court reaffirmed a woman’s abortion rights in 
1992, however,119 it discarded the trimester framework, stating 
that the framework “misconceive[d] the nature of the pregnant 
woman’s interest[] and . . . undervalue[d] the State’s interest in 
potential life.”120  To protect a woman’s right to make “the 
ultimate decision” prior to viability while preserving an 
appropriate level of regulatory latitude throughout pregnancy, the 
Casey Court substituted a new undue burden standard for Roe’s 
trimester system.121  The Court explained that, “[a]n undue 
burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its 
purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”122  
114. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
115. See id. at 163.
116. See id. at 164 (discussing the nature of a woman’s right after the first trimester).
117. See id. at 160 (reciting the meaning of the term “viability”).
118. Id. at 165.
119. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (affirming that “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability 
and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”). 
120. Id. at 873.
121. See id. at 875-76.
122. Id. at 878.
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In a critical departure from Roe, the Court stressed that a State 
may adopt pre-viability regulations aimed at preserving maternal 
health and potential life, even if the regulations have the 
“incidental” effect of increasing the cost of abortion or making 
access to the procedure more difficult.123  With respect to post-
viability regulations, though, the Court charted no new waters, 
leaving states with the higher degree of autonomy that Roe 
permitted in the third trimester.124   
Importantly, the Casey Court declared that decisions 
following Roe were wrong to employ strict scrutiny because that 
standard undervalued the State’s interests in safeguarding 
maternal health and protecting potential life.125  Yet the Court’s 
uneven application and description of the undue burden standard 
over time have made it difficult to pin down the standard’s limits.  
Both in Casey itself and then in Gonzales, the Court signaled that 
the undue burden standard has a rational basis component or at 
least one that is similarly deferential.126  The Court in Hellerstedt 
later suggested otherwise, however, asserting that the undue 
burden standard requires courts to balance a regulation’s benefits 
against its burdens.127  Justice Thomas accused the Hellerstedt 
Court of reframing the undue burden standard as one that 
123. See id. at 874 (“The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed
to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more 
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”). 
124. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to
viability, the State . . . may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where 
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother.’”). 
125. See id. at 871 (indicating that courts were wrong to apply strict scrutiny when
evaluating abortion regulations). 
126. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“Where it has a rational basis
to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar 
certain procedures and substitute others . . . in furtherance of its legitimate interest[] in . . . 
promot[ing] respect for life, including life of the unborn.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (“[T]he 
Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be 
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that 
those same tasks could be performed by others.”). 
127. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (“Casey . . .
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer. . . . [It] is wrong to equate the judicial review . . . with the less 
strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”). 
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resembles strict scrutiny.128  June Medical, though, now brings 
some measure of clarity, rejecting Hellerstedt’s balancing test as 
inconsistent with Casey.129   
In June Medical, a fractured 5-4 majority struck down a 
Louisiana statute that required a physician performing an abortion 
to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.130  In so doing, 
four Justices concluded that the law was invalid under 
Hellerstedt’s balancing test.131  Chief Justice Roberts, the fifth 
Justice in the majority, however, concurred only in the Court’s 
judgment and only based on stare decisis.  The Chief Justice 
noted that he had joined the dissent in Hellerstedt and continued 
to think that the Hellerstedt majority had gone off course,132 but 
he emphasized that the Louisiana law was “nearly identical to the 
Texas [admitting privileges statute]” which the Hellerstedt Court 
declared unconstitutional.133 
Under Marks v. United States, as the June Medical 
judgment’s narrowest basis—the near identity of the Louisiana 
and Texas laws, the near identity of the factual records in 
Hellerstedt and June Medical, and stare decisis—the Chief 
Justice’s concurring opinion represents the holding of the 
Court.134  Thus, one must look to the Chief Justice’s explanation 
of the Constitution’s demands with respect to abortion regulation 
to determine whether a particular regulation stands or must fall. 
128. See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court “transform[ed]
the undue-burden test to something . . . akin to strict scrutiny”). 
129. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J, concurring) (“Nothing about Casey suggested that a weighing of costs and benefits of
an abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”).
130. See id. at 2133 (“Act 620’s admitting-privileges requirement places a substantial
obstacle in the path of a large fraction of those women seeking an abortion for whom it is a 
relevant restriction. . . . [and] is unconstitutional.”). 
131. See id. at 2120 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324)
(“[C]ourts must ‘consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer.’”). 
132. See id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (stating that he “joined the dissent in
[Hellerstedt] and continue[s] to believe that the case was wrongly decided”). 
133. See id. (“Today’s case is a challenge from several abortion clinics and providers
to a Louisiana law nearly identical to the Texas law struck down four years ago in 
[Hellerstedt].”). 
134. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. . . .’”).   
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In his June Medical concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts 
employed stare decisis in two ways.  First, he determined that 
stare decisis required him to reject Hellerstedt’s balancing test to 
“remain[] true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine established in 
[Casey that] better serves the values of stare decisis than would 
following the recent departure” from that doctrine in 
Hellerstedt.135  Second, he concluded that, notwithstanding the 
Hellerstedt Court’s mischaracterization of Casey’s undue burden 
test, stare decisis demanded adherence to the Court’s judgment in 
Hellerstedt to the extent that, but only to the extent that, the 
judgment rests on the conclusion that the Texas admitting 
privileges statute placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion before viability, a conclusion the 
Chief Justice continued to believe was wrong, but that would have 
been sufficient to invalidate the statute under  Casey’s test 
properly understood.136  Reconciling Hellerstedt with the proper 
understanding of Casey’s undue burden standard was necessary 
to the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the Louisiana statute at issue 
in June Medical was unconstitutional, and his articulation of what 
Casey demands now controls future applications of Casey’s 
test.137 
135. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995)) (alterations adopted) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
136. See id. at 2138-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“We should respect the statement
in [Hellerstedt] that it was applying the undue burden standard of Casey. . . . In this case, 
Casey’s requirement of finding a substantial obstacle before invalidating an abortion 
regulation is therefore a sufficient basis for the decision, as it was in [Hellerstedt].”). 
137. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (“When an
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion 
necessary to that result by which we are bound.”).  The United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits both have recognized that Chief Justice Robert’s June Medical 
concurrence controls what Casey’s undue burden standard requires.  See EMW Women’s 
Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 433 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Because all laws 
invalid under the Chief Justice’s rationale are invalid under the plurality’s, but not all laws 
invalid under the plurality’s rationale are invalid under the Chief Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s 
position is the narrowest under Marks. His concurrence therefore “constitutes [June 
Medical’s] holding . . . .”); Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.2020) (“Chief 
Justice Robert’s [sic] vote was necessary in holding unconstitutional Louisiana’s admitting-
privileges law, so his separate opinion is controlling.”).  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit and the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Indiana 
and the District of Maryland, however, have disagreed, insisting that Hellerstedt’s balancing 
test continues to apply because June Medical’s plurality opinion and the Chief Justice’s 
concurrence do not share a sufficient “common denominator.”  See Whole Woman’s Health 
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v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2020) (“In June Medical, the only common
denominator between the plurality and the concurrence is their shared conclusion that the
challenged Louisiana law constituted an undue burden.”); Whole Woman’s Health Alliance
v. Hill, No. 1:18-cv-01904-SEB-MJD, 2020 WL 5994460, at *28  (Oct. 9, 2020) (“[W]e
conclude that June Medical did not hand down a new controlling rule for applying the undue
burden test in abortion cases.  We thus shall apply the constitutional standards set forth in
the Supreme Court’s earlier abortion-related jurisprudence, in particular, Casey and
Hellerstedt.”); Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F.Supp.3d 183, 209
(D. Md. 2020) (“Where [Hellerstedt] remains the most recent majority opinion delineating
the full parameters of the undue burden test, the Court finds that its balancing test remains
binding on this Court.”).  But those courts the Fifth Circuit and district courts drift off course
by ignoring the “common denominator” that both the plurality and the Chief Justice
considered Hellerstedt binding precedent.  For each, though, it was a matter of degree.  While
the plurality considered Hellerstedt binding in full, the Chief Justice treated it more
narrowly—as precedent only to the extent of its conclusion that the Texas admitting
privileges requirement creates a substantial obstacle.  See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1416 n.6 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“On very rare occasions, . . . it can be
difficult to discern which opinion’s reasoning has precedential effect under Marks.  But even
when that happens, the result of the decision still constitutes a binding precedent . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).  And if the Court did not view the Chief Justice’s concurrence
as a retreat from Hellerstedt, one wonders why the Court granted petitions for certioriari,
vacated the underlying judgments, and remanded for further consideration in light of June
Medical two Seventh Circuit decisions that address abortion regulations other than an
admitting privileges requirement.  See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky,
Inc., 937 F.3d. 973, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming an injunction against amendment of
an Indiana parental consent requirement), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 141 S. Ct.
187, 187-88 (2020); Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, 896 F.3d. 809, 812
(7th Cir. 2018) (affirming an injunction against an Indiana statute extending waiting period
following ultrasound), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 141 S. Ct. 184, 184 (2020).
See also Amy Howe, Justice grant new cases, send Indiana abortion cases back for a new
look, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/5TKB-3EVZ (suggesting that Court
remanded the ultrasound case for consideration in light of “the more lenient test outlined” in
the Chief Justice’s concurrence); Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS Abortion GVR’s Suggest June
Medical Narrowed The Right, DORF ON LAW (July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/82V3-SSNU
(describing the decision to remand as pro forma, but describing Hellerstedt’s balancing test
as “now-defunct”).  Finally, although not dispositive, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent from the
Court’s 2021 decision to grant a stay with respect to the Maryland District Court’s injunction
against a restriction on medication abortions makes absolutely no mention of “balancing” or
“benefits” in reference to Casey’s undue burden standard.  See FDA v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 579-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).Given that
Chief Justice Roberts’s substantive analysis of stare decisis begins with his conclusion that
the Texas and Louisiana laws were “nearly identical,” June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2141-42
(Roberts, C.J, concurring), and his professed continuing disagreement with Hellerstedt,
which disagreement included disputing that the petitioners’ evidence was sufficient for the
district court to conclude that the Texas admitting privileges requirement represented a
substantial obstacle, see Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2343-50 (discussing evidentiary
deficiencies), the Chief Justice’s June Medical concurrence properly is interpreted as
limiting Hellerstedt to its facts.  Hellerstedt should have no application outside a challenge
to an admitting privileges regulation, and whether another admitting privileges requirement
might withstand constitutional challenge depends on the underlying record.  If the Chief
Justice considered Hellerstedt applicable to other types of abortion regulations, then the
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June Medical138 is a marked departure from Hellerstedt’s 
uncertain balancing test and a declaration that the undue burden 
standard offers much more latitude for state regulation.  The 
Court in June Medical explains: 
[T]he threshold requirement [is] that the State have a
“legitimate purpose” and that the law be “reasonably related
to that goal.”  So long as that showing is made, the only
question for a court is whether a law has the “effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”139
Casey and Gonzales confirm that the showing that an 
abortion regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose 
is akin to deferential rational basis review. 140 Casey does so 
indirectly when it cites Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 
Inc. in connection with its conclusion that requiring a physician 
to provide information to a woman satisfies constitutional 
demands.141  Deferring to the legislature’s decision to bar 
opticians from engaging in certain activities, the Williamson 
Court had declared that “[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand 
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”142  Gonzales 
is explicit on this point: “Where it has a rational basis to act, and 
it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its 
regulatory power . . . in furtherance of its legitimate interests in 
comparability of the Louisiana and Texas statutes would have been irrelevant.  The factual 
record in those cases regarding the effect on access alone would have been sufficient to 
conclude that the Louisiana statute imposed a substantial obstacle and was unconstitutional. 
138. Because the Chief Justice’s concurrence in June Medical is controlling under
Marks, when this Article refers below to June Medical or the June Medical Court, it is 
referring to the Chief Justice’s opinion.  
139. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2138 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 882, 877). 
140. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit equates the “showing”
with the rational basis standard.  See Friedlander, 978 F.3d at 433 (explaining that the 
requirement that an abortion regulation “be ‘reasonably related’ to a legitimate state interest 
. . . is met whenever a state has ‘a rational basis to . . . use its regulatory power . . . .’”).  One 
scholar, however, describes Casey’s ‘reasonably related’ test “as falling somewhere between 
rational-basis review and intermediate scrutiny—or in other words, as a form of rational-
basis with ‘teeth’ or ‘bite.’”  Stephen G. Gilles, Restoring Casey’s Undue-Burden Standard 
After Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 753 (2017). 
141. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
885 (1992) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). 
142. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
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regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for 
life.”143  And, citing Gonzales, the June Medical Court similarly 
affirmed that the “traditional rule” of permitting legislative 
discretion in cases of medical uncertainty.144 
Moreover, specific applications of the undue burden 
standard in Casey, Mazurek v. Armstrong, and Gonzales indicate 
how little is required in the initial “showing” to which June 
Medical refers.  Pointing out that “the Constitution gives the 
States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be 
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective 
assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be 
performed by others,” the Casey Court upheld the requirement 
that a physician provide information to a woman seeking an 
abortion as a “reasonable means” to achieve the legitimate 
purpose of “ensur[ing] that the woman’s consent is informed,”145  
Similarly, when the Court in Mazurek determined that a law 
banning medical professionals who are not physicians from 
performing abortions did not violate the Constitution,146 the Court 
stressed that Casey “foreclosed” any argument that the “law must 
have had an invalid purpose because ‘all health evidence 
contradicts the claim that there is any health basis’ for the law.”147  
Moreover, the Gonzales Court upheld the federal partial birth 
abortion ban in the absence of “reliable data to measure the 
[extent to which] . . . some women come to regret their choice to 
abort”148 and over Justice Ginsburg’s charge that “[t]he law saves 
not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of 
performing abortion.”149 
Gonzales instructs that those challenging an abortion 
regulation bear the burden of showing150 that the regulation has 
143. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).
144. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885. See also id. at 882 (indicating that seeking to ensure that
woman is adequately informed is a legitimate purpose). 
146. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 (1997) (concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the law violated the undue burden standard). 
147. Id. at 973.
148. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159.
149. Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
150. See id. at 156 (indicating that those challenging the federal partial birth abortion
ban has not met their burden of proof that the ban would impose an undue burden).  See also 
June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (“[T]he plaintiff’s burden 
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the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”151  With respect to the 
very few measures the Court has struck down under Casey’s test, 
the Court described what it considered a massive effect on access.  
In Casey, the Court concluded that Pennsylvania’s spousal 
notification requirement likely would cause a “significant number 
of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children 
. . . to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the 
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”152  The 
Court in Stenberg v. Carhart decided that Nebraska’s partial-birth 
abortion ban would prohibit the most common second trimester 
abortion procedure.153  The Hellerstedt Court determined that 
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement eliminated about half of 
the abortion facilities in the State and that the State’s ambulatory 
surgery center requirement would reduce the number by another 
thirty percent.154  And the Court in June Medical credited the 
District Court’s findings that Louisiana’s admitting privilege 
requirement would “result in a drastic reduction in the number 
and geographic distribution of abortion providers,” thereby 
burdening access “to the same degree [as] or worse [than]” the 
Texas statute, reducing the number of clinics in Louisiana from 
three to one or two and the number of physicians performing 
abortions from five to one or two.155  
When it established the undue burden standard, the Casey 
Court explained: “What is at stake is the woman’s right to make 
in a challenge to an abortion regulation is to show that the regulation’s ‘purpose or effect’ is 
to ‘plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus.’”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2343 (2016) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“Under our cases, petitioners must show that the admitting privileges and ASC 
requirements impose an ‘undue burden’ on women seeking abortions.”). 
151. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 877). 
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (emphasis added).
153. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (emphasis in original) (“Nebraska
does not deny that the statute imposes an ‘undue burden’ if it applies to the more commonly 
used D&E procedure . . . .  And we agree with the Eighth Circuit that it does so apply.”). 
154. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2312, 2316 (discussing the effect of Texas’s
admitting privileges requirement and the stipulated effect of the ambulatory surgery center 
requirement). 
155. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2140 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(indicating the possible changes in the number of clinics and doctors); see also June Medical, 
140 S. Ct. at 2128-32 (Breyer, J., plurality). 
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the ultimate decision . . . . [A] State may not prohibit any woman 
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability.”156  The burden on those challenging an abortion 
regulation is to show that the regulation violates this fundamental 
principal.  
B. Section 5 Power to Enact FOCA and WHPA After June
Medical 
It is in reference to June Medical’s explanation of Casey’s 
undue burden standard that one must assess the extent to which 
Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact FOCA and the WHPA.  Garrett offers a 
structured way to do this.  The first step, the Garrett Court 
explained, “is to identify with some precision the scope of the 
constitutional right at issue.”157  The second is to determine 
whether Congress has “identified a history and pattern of 
unconstitutional” conduct relevant to the legislation under 
consideration.158  And the final step (though the Garrett Court did 
not label it as such) is to evaluate whether the measure is 
“congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the identified harm.159  
156. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 879.
157. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).  See also
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (“The first step of the Boerne inquiry requires 
us to identify the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce . . . .”); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) 
(“Following City of Boerne, we must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment ‘evil’ or 
‘wrong’ that Congress intended to remedy . . . .”). 
158. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.  See also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020)
(“[C]ourts are to consider the constitutional problem Congress faced—both the nature and 
the extent of state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment.  That assessment usually 
(though not inevitably) focuses on the legislative record . . . .”); Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 
(“Whether Title II validly enforces these constitutional rights is a question that ‘must be 
judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.’”); Fla. Prepaid, 527 
U.S. at 639-40 (“[A]ny §5 legislation ‘must be judged with reference to the historical 
experience . . . it reflects.’”). 
159. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.  See also Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[C]ourts are to
examine the scope of the response Congress chose . . . .  Here, a critical question is how far, 
and for what reasons, Congress has gone beyond redressing actual constitutional 
violations.”); Lane, 541 U.S. at 530 (“The only question that remains is whether Title II is 
an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.”); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (indicating that whether Congress has the power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a measure depends on whether there is 
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1. Scope of the Constitutional Right
Defining “with some precision” the right that FOCA and the 
WHRA seeks to protect—a woman’s right to choose abortion—
requires an understanding of the limitations that Roe and Casey 
identify.160  Importantly, the Roe Court commented that the right 
to choose is not “absolute” and is inherently different from other 
rights protected by the constitutional right to privacy.161  Because 
of the pre-natal life involved,162 the Roe Court explained, “at 
some point . . . . [t]he woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any 
right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”163 
Casey likewise stresses that “[a]bortion is a unique act”164 
and that a woman’s freedom “is not . . . unlimited.”165  The 
Constitution, the Casey Court declared, protects “the right of the 
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to 
obtain it without undue interference from the State.”166  “What is 
at stake,” according to the Court, “is the woman’s right to make 
the ultimate decision.”167 
After viability, though, the right to choose is more limited.  
As Roe declares and Casey affirms, “subsequent to viability, the 
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life 
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except 
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.”168 
With the Roe and Casey Courts’ admonitions and Casey’s 
undue burden test as the governing standard, then, the scope of 
the abortion right has two parts.  First, a woman has the right to 
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be 
achieved”). 
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to choose is not absolute and not
unqualified). 
161. Id.
162. Id. at 159 (“She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical
definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.”). 
163. Id.
164. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992). 
165. Id. at 869.
166. Id. at 846.
167. Id. at 877.
168. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S.
at 164-65). 
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“mak[e] the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability.”169  Second, a woman has the right to have an abortion 
after viability when “necessary” to “preserv[e] [her] life or 
health.”170 
2. Evidence of Unconstitutional Conduct
Having defined the abortion right’s scope, one turns to 
evidence of unconstitutional conduct.  The Court in Kimel 
explained that, for Section 5 to confer power on Congress, 
Congress must identify a “significant pattern of unconstitutional 
[behavior sufficient to give] Congress . . . reason to believe that 
broad prophylactic legislation [i]s necessary.”171  The Hibbs 
Court stressed, however, that “it [i]s easier for Congress to show 
a pattern of state constitutional violations” when a demanding 
standard of review applies.172 
The Court’s evaluation of the congressional record in City of 
Boerne and the cases that followed it is demonstrative of the 
importance of the standard of review to Congress’s evidentiary 
burden.  For the Court in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, 
Garrett, and Cooper, the absence of evidence in the congressional 
record of widespread unconstitutional behavior was 
significant,173 and in all of those cases, the constitutional test for 
the applicable state measures and conduct was very lenient.  For 
example, a State contravenes the due process rights of a patent or 
copyright holder only if the State intentionally (or perhaps 
169. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
170. Id.
171. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
172. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
173. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (2020) (indicating that no “part of the
legislative record shows concern with whether the States’ copyright infringements (however 
few and far between) violated the Due Process Clause.”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (“The legislative record of the ADA . . . simply fails to 
show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in 
employment against the disabled.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 64-65 (“Congress never identified 
any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever 
that rose to the level of constitutional violation.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“Congress identified no pattern of patent 
infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“[T]he emphasis of the hearings was on laws of general
applicability which place incidental burdens on religion.”).
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recklessly) infringes on the patent or copyright.174  Similarly, to 
avoid contravening the right to free exercise of religion, a 
regulation need only be neutral and generally applicable.175  And 
state action that discriminates based on age or, in the employment 
context, disability need only have a rational basis.176 
In Hibbs, on the other hand, the Court noted that the 
intermediate standard of review applicable to sex discrimination 
eased Congress’s burden of establishing “a pattern of state 
constitutional violations.”177  Accordingly, the Hibbs Court 
credited evidence in the congressional record not only of states’ 
gender-based discriminatory leave policies and practices, but also 
more generally state laws discriminating against women in the 
workplace and private sector discrimination with respect to leave 
benefits.178  Referring to what Hibbs stated regarding the test for 
gender-based discrimination, the Lane Court noted that the 
constitutional rights associated with access to courts enjoyed at 
least as much, and in some cases more, scrutiny than gender-
based discrimination.179  And, the Court in Lane indicated, the 
evidence of “widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities 
from the enjoyment of public services” is more plentiful than the 
evidence of gender discrimination in Hibbs.180  Specifically, the 
Lane Court noted discriminatory conduct with respect to the 
disabled, not only with respect to access to the courts, but also in 
a wide array of other contexts involving public services.181 
174. See Cooper, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[A]n infringement must be intentional, or at least
reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.”); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 
645 (“[A] state actor’s negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person’s property does 
not ‘deprive’ that person of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.”). 
175. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (“[Employment Division v.] Smith held that
neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not 
supported by a compelling governmental interest.”). 
176. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“States are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions 
toward such individuals are rational.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“States may discriminate on 
the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in 
question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
177. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
178. See id. at 730 (discussing Hibbs’s consideration of evidence associated with
gender-based discrimination). 
179. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (discussing Hibbs).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 523-29 (detailing the history of discrimination against the disabled in
public services). 
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Casey’s undue burden test is not quite as lenient as the 
standards of review that City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett 
describe, nor is the test a heightened standard like the ones 
involved in Hibbs and Lane.  Indeed, Hellerstedt’s uncertain 
balancing test is gone, and the June Medical Court emphasized 
the substantial regulatory latitude that states enjoy under the 
undue burden standard.182  Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales testify 
that the initial “showing” (presumably by the State) which June 
Medical specifies—that the regulation at issue is reasonably 
related to a legitimate purpose—is very deferential.183  Moreover, 
unlike when a traditional heightened standard of review applies, 
the undue burden test does not require the State to show a tight 
means-ends connection.  Instead, it is a party challenging an 
abortion regulation who bears the burden of establishing that the 
regulation places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before viability.184  
Though Casey’s undue burden test undoubtedly calls for 
review that is less deferential than the rational basis standard, 
given the minimal showing required of the government in the first 
part of the test and the heavy burden on a regulation’s challenger 
in the second part, Congress must satisfy greater evidentiary 
demands than those in Hibbs and Lane if it wishes to use Section 
5 to free women from state abortion regulations.185  So long as the 
Court continues to adhere to Casey and Roe, however, existing 
evidence of unconstitutional behavior should be sufficient to 
confer on Congress at least some Section 5 authority in relation 
to abortion.  
Casey is quite clear: “[A] State may not prohibit any woman 
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
182. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (Roberts, C.J,
concurring) (“[W]e have explained that the ‘traditional rule’ that ‘state and federal 
legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and 
scientific uncertainty’ is ‘consistent with Casey.’”). 
183. See id. at 2138, 2157 (discussing Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales).  See also supra
notes 145-49 and accompanying text (explaining how Casey, Mazurek, and Gonzales reveal 
a deferential standard).  
184. See id. at 2133 (indicating that one challenging an abortion regulation has the
burden of showing that a substantial obstacle exists). 
185. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878
(1992). 
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before viability[,]”186 and the Casey Court did nothing to disturb 
the Court’s suggestion in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth that determining when viability occurs is a 
case-by-case medical decision not subject to legislative 
determination.187  Yet, state legislation banning abortion entirely 
or during the early stages of a woman’s pregnancy has a long 
history that continues to this day.  
The Roe Court indicated that the Texas abortion ban at issue 
in the case had existed in substantially the same form since 
1857188 and that “a large majority of jurisdictions” had adopted 
very restrictive abortion bans by the 1950s.189  Moreover, when 
the Court decided Roe, thirty-one states broadly banned abortion 
throughout pregnancy.190 
A similar number of states have pre-viability bans in place 
today.  As of November 2020, twenty-eight states had laws in 
place that prohibit abortion at or before twenty-four weeks, most 
with exceptions for the life or physical health of the woman and 
a few with other exceptions.191  Twenty-four of those twenty-
eight states ban abortion at twenty-two or fewer weeks, with 
fourteen states banning the procedure at twenty or fewer weeks.192  
186. Id. at 879.
187. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)
(“[I]t is not the proper function of the legislature . . . to place viability . . . at a specific point 
in the gestation period.  The time . . . may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination 
. . . is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.”). 
188. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973) (recounting the history of the Texas
abortion ban). 
189. Id. at 139.
190. Id. at 118 n.2 (citing Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming abortion laws). 
191. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov.
1, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZF22-67HU (describing state abortion bans).  Ten of those states 
have more than one week-specific ban.  See id. (same).  The number of weeks is measured 
from the beginning of a woman’s last menstrual period.   
192. See id. (describing state abortion bans).  Alabama has both a twenty-two week
ban and an outright ban; Louisiana has a twenty-two week ban, a fifteen week ban and an 
outright ban; Utah has both an eighteen week ban and an outright ban; Arkansas has a twenty-
two week ban, an eighteen week ban and a twelve week ban; Mississippi has a  twenty week 
ban, a fifteen week ban, and a  six week ban; and Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Dakota, 
and Ohio each have both a twenty-two week ban and a six week ban.  See id. (describing the 
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And three of those fourteen states had laws that prohibit abortion 
entirely, one including exceptions for when the life or physical 
health of the woman is at stake and the other two containing a life 
exception only.193  Finally, sixteen of the twenty-eight states with 
week-specific bans had enacted pre-viability bans that apply 
depending on a woman’s reason for choosing abortion—whether 
based on the sex or race of the fetus or the existence of a “genetic 
anomaly” with respect to the fetus.194 
The Casey Court recognized that, in 1992, viability 
sometimes occurred around twenty-three to twenty-four weeks 
gestation and viability may be achieved earlier in the future 
depending on technological advances.195  Based on a 2015 New 
England Journal of Medicine article, viability now may be 
achieved as early as twenty-two weeks gestation.196  Because the 
number of weeks in the week-specific bans described above is 
measured from the beginning of a woman’s last menstrual period 
and gestational age is measured from the date of fertilization 
(approximately two weeks later),197 a twenty-four week ban bars 
abortion beginning at what may be the earliest date of viability 
right now.  Thus, even a twenty-four week ban likely prohibits at 
least some pre-viability abortions and thereby would run afoul of 
Casey’s categorical proscription of pre-viability bans.  
Alabama, Louisiana, Utah, Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Dakota, 
and Ohio abortion bans). 
193. See id. (describing the abortion bans in Louisiana, Alabama, and Utah).
194. See Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/8935-T7RD (describing state abortion 
bans based on the reason a woman seeks to terminate her pregnancy). 
195. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
860 (1992) (discussing the timing of viability). 
196. See Matthew A. Rysavy et al., Between-Hospital Variation in Treatment and
Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants, 372 N.E. J. MED. 1801, 1804 (2015) (“Overall rates 
of survival, survival without severe impairment, and survival without moderate or severe 
impairment were 5.1% (interquartile range, 0 to 10.6), 3.4% (interquartile range, 0 to 6.9), 
and 2.0% (interquartile range, 0 to 0.7), respectively, among children born at 22 weeks of 
gestation.”). 
197. As the Guttmacher Institute explains, “20 weeks postfertilization is equivalent to
22 weeks [from the beginning of the last menstrual period].”  State Bans on Abortion 
Throughout Pregnancy, supra note 190 (describing state abortion bans).  See also Leo Han 
et al., Blurred Lines:  Disentangling the Concept of Fetal Viability from Abortion Law, 28 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 287, 288 (2018) (“[S]tates have chosen to limit abortion at 20 
weeks after fertilization (22 weeks after the last menstrual period) . . . .”).   
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Consequently, it is not at all surprising that lower courts have 
enjoined all but one ban at twenty weeks or earlier,198 and 
although the vast majority of twenty-two week, twenty-four 
week, and pre-viability purpose-based bans are in effect,199 their 
constitutionality is extremely suspect.200  Considering abortion 
bans alone, the evidence of unconstitutional behavior in relation 
to Roe certainly exceeds what the Court found in City of Boerne, 
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, and Cooper. 
Abortion bans, however, constitute only a small fraction of 
post-Roe state abortion regulatory activity.  As of February 2020, 
each of twenty-six states had enacted twenty or more abortion 
regulations since Roe, and the total number enacted by those 
states collectively exceeded 1,000.201  Louisiana, Indiana, 
Oklahoma, and Arkansas alone accounted for over 250.202  
Among the state measures adopted are TRAP laws, informed 
consent provisions, ultrasound requirements, parental or spousal 
consent or notification measures, prohibitions on the use of 
telemedicine, laws barring non-physicians from performing 
abortions, waiting periods, and reporting requirements.203  Many 
198. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, supra note 190 (indicating
which state abortion bans are in effect). 
199. See id. (indicating which state abortion bans are in effect); Abortion Bans in Cases
of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, supra note 193 (same). 
200. But see Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1109-29 (2014) (proposing a possible basis for concluding that 
a narrow sex selection is constitutional). 
201. See Elizabeth Nash, Louisiana Has Passed 89 Abortion Restrictions Since Roe:
It’s About Control, Not Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/3TLD-MD2D (tabulating abortion regulations on a State by State basis).  
202. See id. (describing Louisiana’s regulatory activity).
203. See Elizabeth Nash & Megan K. Donovan, Ensuring Access to Abortion at the
State Level:  Selected Examples and Lessons, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/E66K-ATJ5 (describing various state abortion regulations); Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/GE7X-T4JV (identifying various types of TRAP regulations); Counseling 
and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/RRV7-CCKY (describing informed consent and waiting period 
requirements); Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/XB4K-ZZYS (describing state laws requiring ultrasounds); An Overview of 
Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/C7VW-GFEL 
(describing various types of abortion regulations); Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/EGX6-ZX87 (specifying states that bar telemedicine 
for medication abortions); Abortion Reporting Requirements, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 
2020), https://perma.cc/AHA4-J8XC (describing reporting requirements). 
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states also have imposed restrictions on medication abortions and 
have adopted bans on particular abortion methods, some 
prohibiting dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortions and a 
majority making “partial birth” abortion illegal.204  
That states are active in abortion regulation, however, is not 
the measure of Congress’s power to enact prophylactic or 
remedial measures under Section 5.  It is widespread 
unconstitutional behavior that matters, and outside of pre-
viability abortion bans and a handful of other lesser limitations, 
invalidation of abortion regulations has been very rare.  
To be sure, the Court invalidated some abortion regulations 
in Casey, Stenberg, Hellerstedt, and June Medical, but in each of 
those cases, the Court determined that the regulations would have 
a severe impact on a woman’s right to make the ultimate 
decision.205  Abortion regulations that do not affect access in a 
similar way have received the Court’s approbation.  As the Casey 
Court explained, “[a]ll abortion regulations interfere to some 
degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.”206  But that does not mean they all are 
unconstitutional.207  The crucial question is whether a regulation 
actually deprives a woman being able to terminate her 
pregnancy.208   
Even before Casey, the Court upheld regulations that had 
applied to first trimester abortions.  In Danforth, for instance, the 
Court rejected a challenge to a Missouri statute that required a 
woman to provide written consent before having a first trimester 
abortion—even though almost no other Missouri law applicable 
204. See Medication Abortion, supra note 202 (detailing restrictions on medication
abortions); Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/W3QQ-9VZ2 (describing state bans 
on abortion methods). 
205. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing Casey, Stenberg,
Hellerstedt, and June Medical). 
206. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875
(1992). 
207. See id at 874 (“The fact that a law . . . has the incidental effect of making it more
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.”). 
208. See id. at 875 (“[T]he Court’s experience applying the trimester framework has
led to the striking down of some abortion regulations which in no real sense deprived women 
of the ultimate decision.  Those decisions went too far . . . .”). 
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to similar medical care contained a comparable requirement.209  
Moreover, the Danforth Court determined that reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements that applied regardless of the stage of 
pregnancy did not run afoul of the Constitution.210  Later, in 
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. 
v. Ashcroft, the Court found constitutional a Missouri law
mandating that tissue from a surgical abortion performed in a
licensed clinic be sent for examination by a pathologist, even
though a pathologist’s examination would make an abortion more
expensive.211  And although the Court in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. invalidated an ordinance
that forced the “attending physician” to provide certain
information to a woman seeking an abortion (rather than allowing
another qualified person to provide the information), the Court
acknowledged that a State may limit to doctors the authority to
perform abortions.212
Of course, the Casey Court opened the door to even more 
state regulation, sustaining a host of statutory provisions, 
including ones like those the Court had struck down under Roe’s 
trimester framework: a specific medical emergency definition 
woven throughout Pennsylvania’s regulatory web, a requirement 
that a physician (rather than another qualified person) provide 
information in connection with a woman’s informed consent, an 
obligation to disclose to a woman information specified by the 
State, a twenty-four hour waiting period, a parental consent 
requirement, and reporting and recordkeeping duties.213  After 
209. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976)
(“[T]he imposition . . . of . . . a [written] requirement . . . even during the first stage . . . is not 
in itself an unconstitutional requirement.  . . . [W]e see no constitutional defect in requiring 
it only for some types of surgery . . . or . . . for abortions.”). 
210. See id. at 79-81 (evaluating Missouri reporting and recordkeeping requirements).
211. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983) (“We think
the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant woman’s abortion 
decision.  The estimated cost of compliance . . . was $19.40 per abortion performed, and in 
light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist’s examination can have, this small cost 
clearly is justified.”) (internal citations omitted). 
212. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447
(1983) (“[W]e have left no doubt that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the 
States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions.”). 
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-887, 899-901 (1992) (evaluating and upholding various
provision of the abortion law at issue); see also Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759-65 (1986) (striking down an informed 
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Casey and consistent with Akron, the Court in Mazurek upheld a 
district court’s denial of an injunction against a law that restricted 
the performance of abortions to physicians (and did not allow 
physician’s assistants to perform them), based on the conclusion 
that there was insufficient evidence that the restriction would give 
rise to a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose 
abortion.214  And finally, after Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales 
upheld against constitutional challenge a federal partial birth 
abortion ban that was narrower than the Nebraska ban at issue in 
Stenberg, even though the federal law applied throughout 
pregnancy and contained no exception that would allow the 
procedure when necessary to protect the health of the woman.215 
Moreover, other than many pre-viability bans, the vast 
majority of existing abortion regulations have not been 
invalidated by lower courts.216  For example, although most 
admitting privileges requirements have been enjoined, the lion’s 
share of TRAP laws remain in place across the country.217  In 
addition, nearly all informed consent, waiting period, ultrasound, 
and reporting requirements and all but two restrictions on 
medication abortions are in effect.218  Finally, even though 
consent measure requiring that a woman be given information specified by the State); City 
of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444, 449-51 (striking down an informed consent measure requiring 
that a woman be given information specified by the State, a 24-hour waiting period, and a 
regulation requiring a physician to provide certain information). 
214. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971, 976 (1997) (discussing the district
court’s conclusion and reversing the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit that denial of the injunction was improper). 
215. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154 (2007) (“In Stenberg the Court found
the statute covered D&E.  Here, by contrast, interpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit 
standard D&E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its terms.”) (internal 
citations omitted); id. at 168 (“Respondents have not demonstrated that the Act, as a facial 
matter, is void for vagueness, or that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.”). 
216. See generally An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 202 (detailing the status
of various abortion regulations); Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 
202 (detailing the status of mandatory counseling and waiting period requirements); 
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 202 (detailing the status of state laws mandating 
conveyance of information related to performance of an ultrasound).  
217. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 202 (indicating the
status of various types of TRAP regulations). 
218. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 202 (detailing the
status of mandatory counseling and waiting period requirements); Requirements for 
Ultrasound, supra note 202 (detailing the status of state laws mandating conveyance of 
information related to performance of an ultrasound); Abortion Reporting Requirements, 
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Stenberg and lower courts have determined that almost all bans 
that would cover D&E abortions are unconstitutional, at least 
fourteen state partial birth abortion bans were in force as of 
November 1, 2020.219 
Still, the invalidation of abortion bans and at least some other 
types of abortion regulations make FOCA and WHPA different 
from the legislation at issue in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, 
Kimel, and Garrett, in which the Court found a dearth of even 
arguably unconstitutional activity.220  For FOCA and WHPA, 
then, so long as the Court continues to recognize a constitutional 
right to choose,221 the question of Section 5 power comes down 
to “congruence and proportionality.”222 
3. Congruence and Proportionality
Emphasizing the necessity of “congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end,” 223 the City of Boerne Court 
stated that Congress may not rely on Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “to attempt a substantive change in constitutional 
protections.”224  Both FOCA and WHPA are just such attempt.  
supra note 202 (detailing the status of reporting requirements); Medication Abortion, supra 
note 202 (detailing the status of medication abortion restrictions). 
219. See Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, supra note
203 (detailing the statute of state abortion-method bans). 
220. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-70 (2001)
(“Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen [relevant] examples from the [congressional] 
record . . . . [E]ven if . . . each incident . . . showed unconstitutional action on the part of the 
State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64-65 
(2000) (“Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less 
any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation.”); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“In 
enacting the Patent Remedy Act, . . . Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement 
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings 
mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years. . . .  Rather, the emphasis of the hearings 
was on laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion.”). 
221. See infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (discussing what overruling Roe
would mean for Congress’s Section 5 power in relation to FOCA and WHPA). 
222. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 532
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As a consequence, adopting either proposed Act would exceed 
Congress’s Section 5 power. 
a. Freedom of Choice Act
Just as Congress enacted RFRA in response to Smith, the 
most recent version of FOCA cites the Court’s decision in 
Gonzales as one of the reasons why Congress should act.225  
Unlike RFRA, however, FOCA does not purport to restore a 
woman’s right to abortion as it existed immediately before 
Gonzales.  Rather, FOCA ventures back “to guarantee the 
protections of Roe v. Wade.”226  
Roe’s trimester framework, though, no longer is the 
controlling Due Process Clause standard for abortion regulations.
227  Casey’s undue burden test governs, and when measured 
against this standard as interpreted in June Medical, it is easy to 
see that FOCA would not be a proportional and congruent 
response to perceived infringements on the right to choose that 
the Court recognized in Roe.   
FOCA prohibits interference—large or small and subject to 
no exception—with a woman’s ability to choose abortion before 
viability.228  But even under Roe’s trimester framework, a woman 
had a right to choose abortion “free of interference” only during 
the first trimester.229  Before viability, but after the first trimester, 
a State could regulate abortion in a manner designed to advance 
maternal health.230  And Casey goes further, stating unequivocally 
that a woman has the right to choose abortion pre-viability free 
225. See Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(9) (2007) (referring to
Gonzales). 
226. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 2(12) (2007) (emphasis added).
227. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992) (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the 
essential holding of Roe.”). 
228. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(B) (2007) (prohibiting a
State from “interfer[ing] with a woman’s right to choose . . . to terminate a pregnancy prior 
to viability.”). 
229. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
230. Id. at 164 (“For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State . . . may . . . regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health.”). 
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from “undue interference.”231  “[I]t is an overstatement,” the 
Casey Court declared, “to describe [the right to choose] as a right 
to decide whether to have an abortion ‘without interference from 
the State.’”232  Indeed, under Casey’s undue burden standard, a 
State may adopt regulations designed to advance maternal health 
and protect potential life so long as the regulations do not have 
the purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s ability to choose abortion before viability.233 
Laws that unquestionably are valid under the undue burden 
standard as interpreted by June Medical would fail under FOCA 
regardless of whether the laws are reasonably related to protecting 
maternal health or potential life or have the effect of creating a 
substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose abortion.234  
FOCA would bar every aspect of the Pennsylvania statute that the 
Court upheld in Casey, the physician-only requirement that the 
Court sustained in Mazurek, and the partial-birth abortion ban that 
the Gonzales Court decided was constitutional.  It would nullify 
regulations whose benefits would be sufficient to satisfy 
Hellerstedt’s more rigorous, though errant balancing test.235  
Indeed, FOCA is so broad that it would invalidate laws applying 
throughout pregnancy that the Court specifically permitted under 
Roe’s trimester framework, including the reporting and 
recordkeeping regulations at issue in Danforth and the pathology 
report requirement the Court upheld in Ashcroft.236   
Similarly, regulations that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause permits would run afoul of FOCA’s 
antidiscrimination provision, which broadly bars government 
discrimination—again, large or small and subject to no 
exception—against a woman’s “exercise of [her statutory right to 
choose] in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities, 
231. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 875.
233. See id. at 877 (describing the undue burden standard).
234. See id. at 878 (describing the undue burden standard); see also June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2138 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining what
the undue burden standard requires).
235. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016)
(describing the undue burden standard as a balancing test) 
236. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing Danforth and
Ashcroft). 
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services, or information.”237  The governing standard for equal 
protection purposes, though, is even more deferential than 
Casey’s undue burden test.  Under Geduldig v. Aiello, a measure 
treating abortion differently from other medical procedures does 
not discriminate based on sex, but on pregnancy, and therefore 
does represent a suspect classification requiring heightened 
scrutiny.238  Moreover, in Harris v. McRae, the Court stressed that 
“[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, 
because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination 
of a potential life.”239  And the Court in Maher v. Roe explained 
that a government’s election to provide funds in connection with 
childbirth, but not abortion, does not infringe on a fundamental 
right because the election “places no obstacles absolute or 
otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”240  Thus, 
discriminating in favor of childbirth and against abortion in 
allocating resources need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest,241 and the Court repeatedly has decided that 
a government may favor childbirth over abortion in providing 
facilities, services, benefits, and information.242  As a result, 
FOCA’s antidiscrimination simply is not a proportional and 
237. Freedom of Choice Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (2007).
238. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (“While it is true that only
women can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification 
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . .  The program divides potential 
recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.  While the first 
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”). 
239. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
240. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
241. See id. at 478 (“[T]he less demanding test of rationality . . . applies in the absence
of a suspect classification or the impingement of a fundamental right.”). 
242. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
886 (1992) (“[U]nder the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive 
measures which favor childbirth over abortion . . . .”); Webster v. Reproductive Servs., 492 
U.S. 490, 510-11 (1989) (upholding Missouri’s decision to permit use of public employees 
and facilities for childbirth, but bar use of public employees for nontherapeutic abortions); 
McRae, 448 U.S. at 325 (“[I]t [is not] irrational that Congress has authorized federal 
reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but not for certain medically 
necessary abortions.”); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (“[W]e find no 
constitutional violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide 
publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services 
for nontherapeutic abortions.”); Maher, 432 U.S. at  478 (determining that Connecticut’s 
decision to fund childbirth costs, but not costs associated with abortion does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
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congruent response to conduct that the Equal Protection Clause 
does not permit.   
Unlike FMLA, which the Court in Hibbs noted was targeted 
at a very narrow aspect of the employment relationship,243 FOCA 
would make “[a]ny law . . . subject to challenge at any time by 
any [woman] who alleges” interference with her statutory right to 
choose or discrimination in exercising that right.244  In this way, 
FOCA is similar to RFRA, ADEA, and Title I of ADA, which the 
Court in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett determined were too 
broad for Congress’s Section 5 power.245  Like RFRA, FOCA 
applies to every level of government and contains no geographic 
limitation, no ending date and no means by which its 
requirements terminate.246  And FOCA’s absolute prohibition 
against interference with a woman’s ability to choose abortion 
before viability and its sweeping antidiscrimination provision 
treads on state authority even more than RFRA, which is not 
absolute, but leaves standing regulations that do not substantially 
burden the exercise of religion and even ones that do impose 
substantial burdens, so long as the more burdensome measures 
are the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest.247 
FOCA is so disconnected from the history of state abortion 
regulation and from the scope of a woman’s right to choose 
abortion before viability—the right to make the “ultimate 
243. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003) (“Unlike the
statutes at issue in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, which applied broadly to every aspect 
of state employers’ operations, the FMLA is narrowly targeted . . . and affects only one 
aspect of the employment relationship.”).  The Court in Lane did not determine that Title II 
of ADA was likewise so limited, but the Court only considered Congress’s Section 5 power 
as it applied to court access.  See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2003) (specifying 
the limitations of the Court’s evaluation of Title II). 
244. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
245. See id. at 532 (stating that RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every 
description and regardless of subject matter”); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. 
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (“[T]he accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required . . . .”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (“The
ADEA makes unlawful, in the employment context, all ‘discriminat[ion] against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.’”).
246. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (discussing RFRA); Freedom of Choice
Act, S. 1173, 110th Cong. § 3(1) (2007) (defining “government” for purposes of the Act); 
see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (noting the failure of a 
federal gun control law to contain geographic limitations). 
247. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (describing RFRA’s requirements).
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decision”248—that “[i]t appears . . . to attempt a substantive 
change in constitutional protections.”249  Consistent with what the 
Court stated with respect to RFRA, “[l]aws valid under [Casey 
and June Medical] would fall under [FOCA] without regard to 
whether they” place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion pre-viability. 250  As a result, FOCA cannot 
be considered preventive or remedial, and Congress does not have 
the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 
the legislation.  
b. Women’s Health Protection Act
Like FOCA, WHPA applies to every level of government, 
contains no geographic or time limitation, and offers no means 
for a State to be relieved of its requirements entirely.251  Arguably, 
though, WHPA, is more modest and focused.  Rather than broadly 
barring states from interfering with a woman’s decision to have 
an abortion pre-viability, WHPA invalidates only particular types 
of abortion measures and even would allow some measures of 
those types if they satisfy a statutory means-ends test.252  Still, the 
WHPA does not have the same degree of focus that the Hibbs 
Court noted with respect to FMLA, and it otherwise does not 
represent a proportionate and congruent response to the alleged 
harm WHPA seeks to prevent or remedy.253  This is so for a 
number of reasons.   
First, inconsistent with both Casey and Roe, WHPA 
generally makes no distinction between regulations that apply 
pre-viability and post-viability.  WHPA refers to viability only in 
248. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992). 
249. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
250. Id. at 534.
251. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 5 (providing
that the Act preempts all inconsistent state and local regulations). 
252. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)-(c)
(covering certain types of regulations and offering states a means to be relieved of the 
statute’s limitations). 
253. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737-38 (2003); see also
Megan K. Donovan, After the Latest Supreme Court Ruling on Abortion, the Women’s 
Health Protection Act Is More Important than Ever, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 30, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/F5VH-J48W. 
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relation to certain prohibitions on abortion and abortion 
procedures.254  Yet, Casey and Roe both recognize that states have 
substantial latitude with respect to post-viability regulations, 
permitting a State to “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion 
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”255  
Second, what WHPA requires in terms of exceptions from 
post-viability restrictions when a woman’s health is in jeopardy 
is a stark departure from Roe and Casey.256  Roe and Casey only 
require post-viability exceptions when “necessary . . . for the 
preservation” of a woman’s “life or health.”257  In addition, the 
Casey Court determined that a medical emergency exception that 
applies when “immediate abortion of [a woman’s] pregnancy [is 
necessary] to avert her death or for which a delay will create 
serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major 
bodily function”258 does not constitute an undue burden.  Under 
WHPA, however, a State must permit a post-viability abortion or 
allow for relief from a pre-viability regulation whenever the 
physician determines in good faith that a failure to perform a post-
viability abortion or a failure to perform any abortion 
immediately would pose a risk—any risk—to a woman’s 
health.259  The upshot of this is that a physician could avoid 
compliance with an abortion restriction if, for example, the 
254. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. §§ 4(a)(8),
4(a)(11). 
255. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,  879
(1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973)).  While Casey’s summary indicates 
that a State’s ability to regulate abortion post-viability relates to its interest in protecting 
potential life, the opinion also provides that a State may regulate abortion post-viability in 
furtherance of other interests.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (identifying as part of Roe’s 
essential holding that a “State[] [has the] power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if 
the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.”). 
Moreover, if a State may prohibit post-viability abortions entirely based on its interest in 
potential life, it would make little sense that a State could not use unnecessary health and 
safety regulations to make it harder to obtain an abortion and thereby protect potential life in 
a more limited way than an absolute bar.  
256. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions
between pre- and post-viability regulations that both Roe and Casey recognized); see also 
Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(9) (addressing post-
viability prohibitions). 
257. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 165).
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(9)-(10).
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physician determines in good faith that the restriction would pose 
a 0.00000001% chance that the woman will suffer from negligible 
anxiety for a day or two.260  
Third, although WHPA offers states some flexibility to 
regulate abortion pre-viability by permitting an otherwise 
statutorily prohibited regulation if a State establishes “by clear 
and convincing evidence” that the regulation “significantly 
advances” a woman’s health or safety and is the least restrictive 
means of doing so, WHPA’s exception varies greatly from the 
undue burden standard.261  Like Title I of ADA as applied to the 
States, WHPA inappropriately shifts the burden of proof with 
respect to challenged abortion regulations: “[WHPA] . . . makes 
it the [State]’s duty to prove that [a regulation does not impose an 
impermissible] burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution 
does) that the complaining party” prove that it does.262  Moreover, 
in upholding Title II of ADA as it applied to conduct involving 
access to courts, the Lane Court observed that the statute only 
demands that a State satisfy a reasonableness standard, not an 
onerous one like WHPA’s “less restrictive” means 
requirement.263  In contrast to Title II, WHPA’s standard 
substantially mirrors the one in RFRA that the City of Boerne 
Court determined Congress did not have Section 5 power to apply 
to the States,264 and similar to the effect under RFRA, “[l]aws 
valid under [Casey] would fall under [WHPA] without regard to 
whether they” place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion previability or apply post-viability with a life 
or health exception.265  For example, WHPA’s prohibition against 
260. Under Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973), a physician’s discretion with
respect to a woman’s health “may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to [her] well-being . . . 
.” 
261. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(d).
262. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
263. See Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-32 (2004) (“Title II does not require States
to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities.  
. . . It requires only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature 
of the service provided . . . .”); see also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 
116th Cong. § 4(d)(2). 
264. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997) (describing RFRA’s
test for permissible state regulation). 
265. Id. at 534.
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requiring “medically unnecessary in-person visits to the provider 
of abortion services”266 almost certainly would reach the twenty-
four hour waiting period that the Casey Court upheld,267 and 
WHPA’s exception only permits measures that “significantly 
advance” health or safety, thereby failing to take into account a 
State’s “profound interest in potential life”268 and a State’s ability 
to regulate in pursuit of that interest even when there is no health-
related benefit.269  In addition, WHPA’s bar against imposing 
more severe penalties on abortion providers than are imposed on 
other health care professionals for similar acts or omissions fails 
to take into account that both Roe and Casey recognize that the 
presence of a fetus makes abortion unique.270   
Finally, WHPA would take away the discretion that state 
legislatures have in determining how to regulate the medical 
profession and hand that role to the courts, which would be a 
substantive change in what the Due Process Clause requires.  
Casey explains that, “[a]s with any medical procedure, the State 
may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman 
seeking an abortion.”271  Moreover, the June Medical Court 
underscored that “[n]othing about Casey suggested that a 
weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job 
for the courts” and that once a showing is made that a regulation 
is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, “the only question 
for a court is whether [the regulation] has the ‘effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.’”272  WHPA, in contrast, would make courts, 
not state legislatures, the arbiters of whether an abortion 
266. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(a)(7).
267. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
885 (1992) (discussing Pennsylvania’s waiting period). 
268. Id. at 837; see also Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong.
§ 4(a)(7).
269. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (discussing Pennsylvania’s waiting period and stating
that, “under the undue burden standard[,] a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures 
which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest”). 
270. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (indicating how the Roe and Casey
Courts described the abortion procedure); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) 
(explaining why abortion is different from other medical procedures). 
271. Id.
272. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136, 2138 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
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regulation sufficiently advances health and safety.273  Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the authority 
to make a shift of this sort. 
V. BEYOND JUNE MEDICAL—IMPLICATIONS IF ROE
IS OVERRULED 
Although Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment will not allow it to enact far-reaching 
statutes like FOCA and WHPA, given the history of judicial 
decisions regarding certain abortion regulations, Congress 
currently has some power to enact preventative or remedial 
legislation with respect to abortion rights.  If Roe is overruled, 
however, its Section 5 power nearly disappears.  Overruling Roe 
would mean that a woman has no right under the Due Process 
Clause to choose abortion,274 and as discussed above, under 
Geduldig v. Aiello, abortion regulations typically will not give 
rise to equal protection claims commanding heightened 
scrutiny.275  Without Roe and Casey, the evidence of 
unconstitutional conduct described above would evaporate 
because laws previously thought to be unconstitutional in fact 
were not.   
Moreover, though it long has been recognized that the 
Fourteenth Amendment bars “the arbitrary deprivation of . . .  
liberty, . . . ‘the Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is, 
. . . was [not] designed to interfere with the power of the State, 
sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to 
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of 
the people[.]’”276  For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, then, just 
273. See Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, S. 1645, 116th Cong. § 4(d)(1)
(providing that a State must convince a court that a “limitation or requirement significantly 
advances the safety of abortion services or the health of patients”). 
274. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it 
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the Ninth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
275. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing Geduldig).
276. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887).
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like legislation that discriminates based on age or disability,277 
abortion regulation would need only be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.  This, the Court emphasized in 
Heller v. Doe, is an extremely deferential standard: 
[A regulation] neither involving fundamental rights nor 
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong 
presumption of validity. . . . [A] legislature . . . need not 
“actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale 
supporting its [regulation].” . . . Instead, a [regulation] “must 
be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
[regulation].”278 
Given the State’s interests in protecting potential life and 
women’s health,279 it would be nearly impossible to establish that 
an abortion ban, limitation, or regulation does not meet this 
standard.280  Congress cannot enforce under Section 5 what the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect under Section 1.  
277. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (“States
are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the 
disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“States may discriminate on the basis of age without 
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.”). 
278. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (internal citations omitted).  See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (describing rational basis review in the 
due process context). 
279. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73 (describing government interests supporting
abortion regulations). 
280. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,154 (1973) (“[A] State may properly assert
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in 
protecting potential life.”); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (“[T]he asserted ‘right’ to 
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause.  The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington’s assisted-suicide 
ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests.”); Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20 
(“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines 
is accorded a strong presumption of validity.  Such a classification cannot run afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment 
and some legitimate governmental purpose.”) (internal citations omitted); Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (“The burden is on the one attacking 
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Roe endures—at least for now.  Thus, Congress seems to 
have some meaningful measure of power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to adopt preventive and remedial 
legislation with respect to the constitutional right to choose that 
Roe established and that the Casey Court declared to be within 
Section 1’s Due Process Clause.  Contrary to Hellerstedt, though, 
June Medical explains that courts are not to engage in some 
rigorous balancing of benefits and burdens when evaluating a due 
process challenge to an abortion regulation.281  Casey’s undue 
burden standard, the June Medical Court emphasized, leaves 
states with much more freedom to regulate abortion.  As a 
consequence, Congress’s Section 5 power in the abortion context 
is not quite as hearty as one might have thought during 
Hellerstedt’s reign. 
Enacting FOCA or WHPA would be “a considerable 
congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives 
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their 
citizens.”282  Because of June Medical, it now is quite apparent 
that Congress does not have the power under Section 5 to adopt 
either proposed Act.  “Simply put, [WHPA and FOCA are] not 
designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be 
unconstitutional because of their” effect on a woman’s ability to 
choose abortion.283  Proponents of FOCA and WHPA will need 
to make significant changes to the bills to squeeze them into 
Section 5.  If they don’t want to do that, they must find 
congressional power elsewhere in the Constitution. 
281. See June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Casey Court did not adopt a balancing test).
282. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
283. Id. at 534-35
